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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
vs. : 
DAVID R. WARDEN, : Case No. 880575-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : (Argument Priority - 2) 
Brief of Respondent 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals to hear this appeal by 78-2a-3(2)(d) U.C.A. (1988 Supp.), 
77-35-26(4) (a) U.C.A. (1988 Supp.), and Rule 26 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. 
2. Defendant appeals from his conviction by jury of 
negligent homicide in the Second Circuit Court, State of Utah, 
Davis County, Layton Department. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to prove that 
Defendant's conduct caused the death of Jareth Young? 
2. Was there sufficient and competent evidence to 
prove that defendant acted with criminal negligence? 
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3. Was the State's expert testimony properly admitted? 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
In September 1986, the defendant, a physician, attended 
a 19-year-old unwed female with regard to her pregnancy and 
agreed to attend the delivery of the expected child in the home 
of the patient. At that time the defendant estimated the 
expected date of delivery to be December 17, 1986. 
On November 7, 1986, defendant, knowing the 
circumstances evidenced pre-term labor, attended the birth of the 
child at the home and diagnosed the newborn as suffering from 
respiratory distress syndrome and stated that the child was 
premature. When asked if the child should be hospitalized, the 
defendant indicated that it would not be necessary and left the 
infant in the care of his mother and grandmother. 
The infant died within 12 1/2 hours of birth from 
respiratory distress syndrome due to prematurity. 
An expert witness testified that had the child been 
taken to the University of Utah Neonatology Intensive Care Unit, 
the child would have had a 99% chance of survival. 
Defendant was charged and convicted of the crime of 
Negligent Homicide in connection with the death of the child. It 
is that conviction from which the defendant now appeals. 
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B. Course of Proceedings, 
Defendant was initially tried by jury beginning 
November 16, 1987. However, the Court declared a mistrial on 
November 18, 1987 due to improper testimony given by one of the 
State7s witnesses (R. at page 3). 
A second jury trial was held beginning February 22, 
1988, which continued through February 26, 1988, Defendant was 
convicted of the offense as charged (R. at page 7). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court, 
On March 11, 1988, the defendant filed a Motion to 
Arrest Judgment (R. at pages 73 through 133). The Motion was 
heard April 7, 1988 (R. at page 7). The Court denied the Motion 
in a written decision dated June 23, 1988 (R. at pages 154 
through 159). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged in the Fourth Circuit Court, 
Layton Department, with the Negligent Homicide of Jareth Young, 
the infant son of Joanne Young. 
Joanne Young is a citizen of England and came to the 
United States in July of 1984, when she was fifteen years old 
(Transcript, hereinafter referred to as T. Vol.Ill, p.39). 
During the month of March, 1986, she became pregnant at the age 
of seventeen years (T. Vol.Ill, p.40). 
In July, 1986, Joanne went to Dr. Mark Bitner, a board 
certified obstetrician/gynecologist, who confirmed that she was 
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indeed pregnant. Dr. Bitner established the projected date of 
confinement at about December 21, 1986 (T. Vol.11, p.175). 
Joanne's recollection was that the due date was December 10th (T. 
Vol.Ill, p.43). 
Joanne learned that the defendant did home deliveries 
and decided she wanted a home delivery because she was too 
embarrassed at being pregnant out-of-wedlock and did not want to 
go to a hospital and have people know (T. Vol.Ill, p.48). 
Joanne first went to Dr. Warden on September 8th (T. 
Vol.Ill, p.50). He established her due date as being December 
17th (T. Vol.Ill, p.53). Joanne was not given any instruction by 
Dr. Warden as to what to do should anything unusual occur nor was 
she given instruction as to the care of the baby (T. Vol.Ill, 
p.57) . 
At approximately 8 o'clock on the morning of November 
7th, Joanne discovered she was having cramps and was bleeding an 
amount of blood consistent with a heavy day of a normal menstrual 
period (T. Vol.Ill, pp. 60-63). Joanne's mother, Ivy Young, made 
a phone call to Dr. Warden, who was at the University of Utah, 
attending a football game. Dr. Warden told her not to worry, 
that Joanne was in labor (T. Vol.1, p.61). He instructed her to 
call back at 1:00 p.m. (T. Vol.1, p.62). 
Ivy called again at 1:00 p.m. (T. Vol.1, p.64) and was 
told not to bring Joanne to the clinic (T. Vol.1, p.65). Ivy 
phoned again at 4:00 p.m. to inform the defendant that Joanne was 
losing blood clots, at which time he told her to "stop fussing" 
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(T. Vol.1, p.66). Ivy called again at about 10:15 p.m. to tell 
the defendant that Joanne was in the last stages of labor (T. 
Vol-1, p.67) . 
The defendant arrived at the Young home at approximately 
10:30 p.m. (T. Vol.1, p.68) and the baby, Jareth Young, was born 
within a matter of minutes (T. Vol.Ill, p.74, also T. Vol.1, 
p.76). Ivy then weighed the infant on the bathroom scales and 
reported to Dr. Warden that the weight of the baby was about four 
pounds (T. Vol.1, p.73). 
Soon after the birth, Ivy noted that the infant made 
unusual sounds, "like a pig grunting" (T. Vol.1, p.78). She also 
noticed that the hands and torso of the baby were purplish-blue 
(T. Vol.1, p.79). Ivy repeatedly requested that Defendant check 
Jareth (T. Vol.1, pp.73,82,83,84). Defendant diagnosed the baby 
as suffering from respiratory distress syndrome and suggested 
that positioning the baby would relieve the syndrome (T. Vol.Ill, 
p.98) and decided not to hospitalize the baby (T. Vol.IV, pp.175-
177) . 
Defendant remained at the Young home for about an hour. 
The only instructions he gave to Ivy Young was to watch the baby 
through the night (T. Vol.1, p.86) and if she needed help to call 
(T. Vol.11, p.115). He did not tell her that the baby could die 
of the respiratory condition.(T. Vol.IV, p.184). 
In the morning when Jareth's condition had 
deteriorated, Ivy Young attempted to contact the defendant at his 
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office (T. Vol.1, p.95), at his home (T. Vol.1, p.96), and again 
at his office (T. Vol.1, p.98) with no success. 
Finally, she contacted her bishop in the LDS Church (T. 
Vol.1, p.98), who responded with a pediatrician, Dr. Kramer (T. 
Vol.1, p.101). The infant was transferred to the hospital but 
died soon thereafter (T. Vol.1, p.104). 
The State Medical Examiner, Dr. Edwin S. Sweeney, 
testified that Jareth Young died of Respiratory Distress 
Syndrome, due to prematurity (T. Vol.Ill, p.13). He opined that 
the weight of the child was about four pounds (T. Vol.Ill, p.15), 
and that the gestational age of the baby was 3 3 - 34 weeks (T. 
Vol.Ill, p.34). 
According to Dr. Kramer (T. Vol.11, p.247) and Dr. 
Branch (T. Vol.Ill, p.162), there is no recognized specialty in 
home delivery in the State of Utah. 
Dr. Frank Kramer, a board certified pediatrician who 
came to the home at the request of the LDS bishop and attended 
the infant until his death at Humana Davis North Hospital, 
testified that based upon the physical size of the baby, one 
could tell it was not a well child (T. Vol.11, p.276). Dr. 
Kramer testified that the baby should have been hospitalized 
immediately following birth (T. Vol.11, p.277), and that Jareth 
Young was obviously premature (T. Vol.11, p.280). Finally, Dr. 
Kramer testified that the local hospital, Humana Davis North, has 
a policy that a mother should be sent to a center with an 
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intensive care unit if the mother is felt to be less than 35 
weeks of gestation (T. Vol.11 p.281). 
Dr. Ware Branch, an obstetrician-gynecologist for the 
University of Utah, testified that he teaches obstetrics at the 
University of Utah College of Medicine, teaching general 
principles of obstetrics to medical students and residents and 
understands the standard of care of both general practitioners 
and other specialists in the area of obstetrics (T. Vol.Ill, 
pp.162-163). The general principles in that regard do not vary 
from a doctor practicing in a hospital setting as opposed to a 
home setting (T. Vol.Ill, p.164). 
When given hypothetical facts equivalent to the 
situation of this case up to 8:00 a.m. on November 7, 1986, Dr. 
Branch indicated that the standard of care would be to see the 
patient for evaluation for the use of tocolysis, or stopping 
labor (T. Vol.Ill, p.179). 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Branch 
about the standard of care regarding leaving a baby in Jareth7s 
condition with the family at home, and Branch replied, "... in my 
opinion, this baby has to be observed in the hospital setting..." 
(T. Vol.Ill, p.225). 
Finally, Dr. Branch in evaluating the course of action 
taken by Dr. Warden, stated, "... what would I tell a resident in 
training? He better not ever, ever do that again or I711 see to 
it that he's on the street." He then elaborated, "Well, I mean, 
I have, in discussion with you here today, disagreed with the 
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prospective management of the events of the 7th of November and I 
would disagree with them again." (T. Vol.Ill, p.225). 
Further, he stated, "I think that the judgment decision 
to leave a small, quite likely premature baby in the hands of 
someone who doesn't really have any medical experience, I think 
that judgment is far too liberal for these times and I wouldn't 
do that." (T. Vol.Ill, p.227). 
Dr. Gary Chan, a neonatologist for the University of 
Utah, testified that he has taught interns and residents in 
training, in pediatrics, family practice, anesthesiology, and 
obstetrics, and is familiar with the standards of practice in all 
of those areas (T. Vol.Ill, p.235), and further, that the 
standard would not vary from a hospital to a home-birth setting 
(T. Vol.Ill, p.276). He stated the standard of care for a baby 
of four pounds and 33 to 34 weeks gestation age "... would 
certainly be admitted to a newborn intensive care unit." (T. 
Vol.Ill, p.239). 
Given a hypothetical circumstance consistent with that 
of the birth of Jareth Young, Dr. Chan stated that if Jareth were 
immediately in his care in the hospital intensive care unit, the 
probability of survival would have been 99 per cent (T. Vol.Ill, 
p.248) . 
Dr. Chan also stated that any physician should be able 
to recognize if the baby was in respiratory distress (T. Vol.Ill, 
p.249) and failure to treat the baby would result in increased 
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risk of mortality to five, ten, or fifteen per cent (T. Vol.Ill, 
p.250). 
When asked if it would be within the standard of care in 
this area for physicians to leave that baby in a home setting 
with a lay person monitoring the progress of that baby 
immediately after birth, Dr. Chan's response was, "Absolutely 
not." (T. Vol.Ill, pp.256, 273). He later stated the risk of 
death to a baby left in the care of a lay person would increase 
10 to 20 times. 
Dr. Chan stated the grunting sound was symptomatic of 
respiratory distress (T. Vol.Ill, p.276). It is possible to 
adjust the position of the baby to eliminate the sound, but it 
dees not affect the exertion of the baby or the progress of the 
disease (T. Vol.Ill, p.277). This testimony was in direct 
contradiction to Dr. Warden's. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Respondent makes three arguments in response to 
Appellant's brief: 
1. Defendant caused the death of Jareth Young. 
Defendant was aware of the risk of death to Jareth Young and 
assumed a position of responsibility for the health of Jareth. 
He knew that the family relied upon his expertise for the 
diagnosis and treatment of the baby. In spite of those 
circumstances, he refused to come to the home or to his own 
clinic to make proper evaluation of what was consistent with 
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signs of premature labor. He diagnosed Respiratory Distress 
Syndrome and withheld all information regarding diagnosis, 
prognosis, treatment, and possible outcome from the family. He 
instead prescribed a positioning therapy which is ineffective in 
affecting the progress of the disease, but instead hides the most 
obvious symptom. All of this created a circumstance of peril for 
Jareth Young of which only defendant was aware until the infant 
was moribund• 
2. The Actus Reus of negligent homicide is the causing 
of the death of the victim* The mens rea of Negligent Homicide 
is criminal negligence. Part of the proof of criminal negligence 
is a showing of a risk of the nature and degree that the failure 
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care of an ordinary person in all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's viewpoint. The standard is an %ordinary person7 
standard and need not be proven by expert witnesses. In any 
event, intent in a criminal case never needs to be proven by 
expert testimony and may be inferred by the circumstances. 
3. The State's experts were qualified to testify and 
their testimony was properly admitted. Their testimony was 
helpful to the jury. There is no recognized specialty in home 
deliveries and any physician who is aware of the standard of 
care for delivery and immediate aftercare of infants may testify 
where the standard does not vary from one specialty to another. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT 
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS THE CAUSE OF 
JARETH YOUNG'S DEATH 
The evidence is that Defendant created a situation of 
peril for Jareth Young by assuming a position of responsibility 
for the medical well-being of Jareth Young, determining that 
Jareth suffered from Respiratory Distress Syndrome, then failing 
to have him properly treated and increasing the peril by leaving 
him with uninformed laymen. 
Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence 
to establish a causal relationship between defendant's conduct 
and the death of Jareth Young. This court has adopted the 
following standard with regard to a challenge for sufficiency of 
the evidence: 
"In reviewing a claim of insufficient 
evidence, this Court must view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the verdict and 
will interfere only when the evidence is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable 
person would not possibly have reached a 
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Jamison, 99 Utah Adv.Rpt. 32, 34 (1989), 
quoting State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539,550 
(Utah 1983). 
Jareth Young died of Respiratory Distress Syndrome due 
to prematurity, according to the State Medical Examiner, Dr. 
Edwin Sweeney. Defendant, by his acts or omissions in this case, 
failed to (A) take reasonable steps to assess the possibility of 
preventing the premature birth by tocolysis, (B) properly treat 
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the Respiratory Distress Syndrome, (C) transport the victim to a 
facility where the syndrome could be properly treated, and (D) 
inform Ivy Young of the risks involved and symptoms to observe. 
(A). TOCOLYSIS. Dr. Branch's testimony indicated that 
the defendant should have gone to Joanne Young upon the 
indication that she was bleeding in order to evaluate for the use 
of tocolysis, or the stopping of labor (T. Vol.Ill, p.179). 
The Defendant admitted that he was aware of the 
technology and the considerations involved in tocolysis 
(T. Vol.Ill, pp.129-131). He testified that tocolysis is not 
possible in the home setting (T. Vol.Ill, p.131). Yet the 
defendant declined to come to evaluate Joanne Young in person, 
opting instead to make his decision based upon a telephone call 
with the grandmother, Ivy Young. The defendant declined to come 
to the house until the contractions were three minutes apart. 
In fact, the Defendant testified that he elected not to 
go on the basis of his diagnosis that the patient was in false 
labor (T. Vol.Ill, p.163). It is not possible, at this point, to 
know whether tocolysis was a possibility. Had it been possible, 
it would have prevented the prematurity of Jareth Young. The 
failure to examine and evaluate for the application of tocolysis 
may not in itself evidence proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Defendant caused the death of Jareth Young. In the totality of 
the circumstances, however, the failure to evaluate evidences one 
of the many opportunities Defendant had to avert the substantial 
and unjustifiable risk of death arising from this premature 
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birth. 
(B). IMPROPER TREATMENT. Defendant testified that he 
diagnosed the infant as suffering from Respiratory Distress 
Syndrome (T. Vol.Ill, p.97). His treatment was to improve the 
respiratory effort and breathing of the infant by positioning the 
baby (T. Vol.Ill, p.98). He stated that at that time he believed 
the baby would do far better in the hospital (T. Vol.Ill, p.97). 
Yet, when he was asked about hospitalizing the baby he said it 
would not be necessary (T. Vol. II p. 126). 
Dr. Chan testified that positioning the baby does 
nothing to affect the exertion of the baby or the progress of the 
disease (T. Vol.Ill, p.277). 
If the jury accepted Dr. Chan's testimony over that of 
Dr. Warden, they could have easily concluded (1) that Dr. Warden 
properly diagnosed the disease, (2) that he improperly treated 
the disease, (3) that he created the peril by minimizing the 
seriousness of the symptoms to both Sharon and Ivy Young, (4) 
that he further created the peril by teaching a positioning 
method which merely masked the symptom making it imperceptible to 
a lay person, and (5) that he breached his duty to care for the 
infant by leaving it in the care of laypersons who did not have 
the expertise to recognize the progress of the disease. 
(C). FAILURE TO HOSPITALIZE. The defendant failed to 
hospitalize his patient at two critical points in his management 
of the case. The first point was prior to the delivery. Dr. 
Branch testified that given the circumstances prospectively that 
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presented themselves prior to the delivery of Jareth Young: 
"Given the setting of the patient, 
probably if not—possibly if not probably 
being in pre-term labor, given the setting 
that she's having some bleeding that is as yet 
unidentified in terms of etiology, and given 
the probability of labor, you know, my opinion 
is the baby is going to do better in a 
hospital. The reason is very simple. It 
provides immediate capability for oxygenation 
and carbon dioxide exchange." (T. Vol.Ill, 
p.184) . 
The second point at which the defendant failed to 
hospitalize the baby was after the delivery and diagnosis of 
Respiratory Distress Syndrome. Dr. Chan testified that treatment 
of Respiratory Distress Syndrome needs to be done in a tertiary 
care facility, of which there are four locally: University of 
Utah, L.D.S. Hospital, McKay-Dee, and Utah Valley (T. Vol.Ill, 
p.240). Dr. Warden indicated he was familiar with the disease 
and, although he had no formal training, he was familiar and had 
experience in that regard (T. Vol.IV, p.131). He further stated 
that of the home births he had attended involving pre-term labor, 
eight out of ten developed Respiratory Distress Syndrome and 
three out of ten were ultimately admitted to the hospital for 
treatment (T. Vol.IV, p.132). Yet the defendant decided not to 
hospitalize in this case. 
On cross-examination of the defendant, the following 
exchange occurred regarding that decision: 
Q: We have a risk here, a child who obviously is 
exhibiting the symptoms of respiratory distress syndrome; is that 
right? 
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A: Correct. 
Q: You're aware of that risk? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You're aware that this child could, if it worsens, 
die from that, are you not? 
A: That's correct. 
B: You're aware of all those factors? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You have a grandmother here that you have confidence 
in relative to her care of that child, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Now at that point in time, you elect in your own 
mind, exercise that judgment and you elect not to recommend that 
the child be take to the hospital at that time; is that right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Now you're also aware, are you not, Doctor, as to 
the progressive nature of this disease? 
A: Yes, I am. 
Q: And you're also aware, are you not, that exercising 
caution in these circumstances is of the utmost importance to the 
life of that child? 
A: That's correct. (T. Vol.IV, pp.175-177) 
In fact, Defendant was not authorized to admit the 
infant into any hospital because he had no malpractice insurance 
(T. Vol.IV p. 122-124). In the event the defendant had decided 
to hospitalize the child, he would have had to call a physician 
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to admit the child or take the child to the emergency room as any 
other person might (T. Vol.IV, pp.126-127). 
D. Failure to Adequately Inform Ivy Young. The actions 
of Ivy Young subsequent to Defendant leaving the house do not 
vindicate defendant nor relieve him from criminal responsibility. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
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 (W) here a party by his wrongful conduct 
creates a condition of peril, his action can 
properly be found to be the proximate cause of 
a resulting injury, even though later events 
which combined to cause the injury may also be 
classified as negligent, so long as the later 
act is something which can reasonably be 
expected to follow in the natural sequence of 
events." State v. Hallett. 619 P.2d 335,339 
(Utah 1930). 
Defendant claims that the failure of Ivy Young to take 
some action was an intervening cause. The question then is 
whether the jury could reasonably conclude that Ivy's actions 
were reasonably expected to follow. In fact, her failure to act 
was not only reasonably expected, but caused by Defendant's 
reassurances that action was not needed. Defendant had 
consistently minimized the concerns of Ivy Young during the day 
of the delivery; refusing to come to see Joanne and telling Ivy 
to "stop fussing." 
The defendant admitted on the stand that he was the only 
person with the ability to recognize the risk: 
Q: Doctor, you also don't dispute the fact that this 
child, on the date in question when you delivered it, exhibited 
the symptomatology of hyaline membrane or respiratory distress 
syndrome, do you? 
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A: That's correct. 
Q: And you don't dispute the fact that the ability and 
experience and objectivity to observe and diagnose such a disease 
relative to respiratory distress syndrome, that nobody but you in 
that home birth setting had the ability to do that, do you? 
A: No, 
Q: No, you do dispute that? 
A: No, I don't dispute it. No, I don't. 
Q: You were the only person who had the expertise and 
the ability to make those observations and make that 
determination, weren't you? 
A: That's correct. (T. Vol. IV, pp.210,211). 
Ivy Young's testimony was that Defendant gave her no 
instructions regarding hospitalization, symptoms, diagnosis, or 
prognosis, but simply told her to watch the baby through the 
night (T. Vol. I pp.85-86). 
Defendant's testimony, at most, was that he asked her to 
watch for "changes" in temperature, color, and respirations (T. 
Vol.IV pp.101-102,183-184). She was given no objective means of 
measuring what constituted a significant change. Indeed, the 
infant was already colder than a normal baby, bluer than a normal 
baby, and breathing in a abnormal manner. The defendant's 
statement on cross-examination as to his instruction to Ivy was: 
Q: ...did you tell her that if these things continued 
that it could result in death to the child? 
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A: I did not tell her that it could result in the death 
of the child. 
Q: Did you tell her that it would require immediate 
hospitalization if any of these things occurred? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You did? 
A: Yes. 
Q: In what context did you tell her that? 
A: In the hallway I told her that if this baby had a 
worsening condition that she should call and we would probably 
need to admit it to the hospital. 
Q: We would probably need to admit it to the hospital? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Is that telling her that it would need immediate 
hospitalization, Doctor? 
A: No. (T. Vol.IV, pp.134-185) 
Even if the court accepts the defendant's account of the 
instructions given to Ivy Young, the evidence from the medical 
experts is that the symptoms Defendant allegedly instructed Ivy 
to watch for would not necessarily be helpful in determining the 
progress of the disease. 
With regard to respiratory effort, Dr. Kramer testified 
that an infant becoming critical in it's progress in the disease 
might have "...heavier breathing and grunting, retraction; it's 
an indication that the child is not doing well, but again, some 
babies don't have those symptoms. They just kind of be quiet, 
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and if their intoxicating themselves, they may not show too 
much." (T. Vol. II p.311). Dr. Chan testified that when the baby 
is becoming moribund or near death it may become quieter than it 
had been before (T. Vol.Ill, pp.244-245). In other words, if the 
grunting became better, not worse, it would, in fact be an 
indication of deterioration rather than improvement. 
With regard to color, Dr. Kramer stated, "The color may 
be somewhat bluish, very pale, but color is not very helpful. It 
may misjudge the condition of a child just by color." (T. Vol.11, 
p.288) . 
Both Dr. Kramer and Dr. Chan testified about a "crash" 
which Dr. Chan described as a "sudden change in the baby's vital 
signs." Dr. Chan testified that temperature is not an indicator 
of the "crash" (T. Vol.Ill p.244) and that a lay person could not 
objectively monitor the progress of the disease (T. Vol. Ill 
p.253). In this case, by Defendant's account, Ivy Young was 
under instructions to watch for changes in respiration, 
temperature, and color and to act upon changes in those symptoms. 
In fact, the respirations did not become more labored, 
but less labored as described by Dr. Chan, a symptom Ivy would 
have taken for improvement but really meant a "crash". Any 
changes in color or temperature were subtle. Ivy's inaction is 
attributable, therefore, to Dr. Warden's failure to adequately 
instruct Ivy, and therefore reasonably expected. 
It is also important to note that had Ivy been 
successful in contacting Defendant, at best, Defendant's reaction 
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would have been to have the infant admitted to a hospital. 
Defendant claims now that the delay in hospitalization was the 
fault of Ivy Young and not of the defendant• Yet when the infant 
was hospitalized it was through the emergency room of the local 
hospital, Humana Davis North (T. Vol.11 p. 264), not a tertiary 
care hospital equipped to treat a neonate for respiratory 
distress as described by Dr. Chan (T. Vol.Ill p.240). Nowhere 
in the record is there any evidence that Defendant informed Ivy 
Young that the child would have to be treated in a tertiary care 
hospital, nor did he describe to her the nature of the treatment 
that would be required if hospitalized. Defendant was the only 
person present who had that knowledge. 
It is therefore a reasonable conclusion of the jury that 
the Defendant created the peril by abandoning Jareth Young in the 
care of a lay person, the grandmother, who was not instructed in 
either the symptoms to observe or the possible consequence. Ivy 
Young was not an intervening cause, but a part of the peril 
created by Defendant. But for the fact that the defendant 
attended the infant, allayed the fears of the family regarding 
the size and symptoms of the disease, and instructed them that 
the grunting was common in premature babies, the baby would have 
been hospitalized at the time of birth. That Ivy Young would not 
recognize the gravity of the situation based upon these 
circumstances is clearly foreseeable. 
This court should not substitute its own opinion for the 
jury's finding with regard to this issue. Where there is 
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sufficient evidence for the jury to come to the conclusion that 
Ivy's actions were reasonably foreseeable, this court should 
abide by that decision, 
"Moreover, when reasonable minds might 
differ as to whether it was the creation of 
the dangerous condition (defendant's conduct) 
which was the proximate cause, or whether it 
was some subsequent act (such as Ms. Carley's 
driving), the question is for the trier of 
fact to determine." Hallet, supra at 339. 
POINT II 
THE STATE HAD NO BURDEN TO PROVE GROSS 
DEVIATION BY EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY AND MET 
ITS BURDEN TO PROVE CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. 
A. Expert medical testimony is not a requirement to 
prove intent in a criminal action against a doctor. 
Appellants comparison of this criminal case to a 
medical malpractice case is an "apples to oranges" comparison 
because the standard of care in a criminal case applies to the 
mens rea while the standard of care in a malpractice case applies 
to the conduct. 
The cases cited by appellant regarding degree of 
deviation from a standard of care all deal with conduct rather 
than intent. The court in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348,351 
(Utah 1980) stated: 
"Before the Plaintiff can prevail in a 
medical malpractice action, he must establish 
both the standard of care required of the 
Defendant as a practicing physician in the 
community and the Defendant's failure to 
employ that standard. (emphasis added) 
Id at 351 
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The definition of criminal negligence mentions "standard 
of care11 in order to clarify the nature of the risk: 
"The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint," (emphasis added) 
U.C.A. 76-2-103 (4) (1953 as amended) 
Since the statute refers to risk rather than conduct, 
the prosecution does not have to prove that the defendant acted 
in gross deviation from the standard. Indeed, if the state were 
to be required to prove such, there would be no distinction 
between criminal negligence and recklessness since both 
definitions contain the language "gross deviation". 
The burden on the state is to prove that the risk was of 
the seriousness, obviousness, and within the control of the 
defendant to the "...degree that the failure to perceive (the 
risk) constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Id. Competent evidence 
to show the nature and degree of the risk and the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's standpoint is sufficient to sustain 
the prosecution's burden. This again is an issue for the jury 
which should not be disturbed by this court. 
"It is the exclusive province of the jury 
to grade the degree of culpability. Intent 
need not be directly proved but may be 
inferred." State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566, 
569 (Utah 1983). 
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B. Expert medical witnesses are not a requirement to 
prove criminal negligence in a negligent homicide case involving 
a medical doctor. 
The "degree of deviation" is measured from an "ordinary 
person standard of care" and not a "medical standard of care" and 
does not require expert testimony• 
The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint, (emphasis added) 
U.C.A. 76-2-103(4) (1953 as amended) 
A statute carries with it the presumption that it is 
valid, and that the words and phrases were chosen advisedly to 
express the legislative intent, Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 
449 (Utah 1967). The legislature here specified that the 
standard for measurement in criminal negligence is an ordinary 
man standard. It is not required that mental state be proven by 
expert testimony. 
In the case of State v. Nicholson 585 P.2d 60 (Utah 
1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that for purposes of our 
homicide statute the court is not bound to accept expert 
testimony with regard to malice. Nicholson dealt with a homicide 
charged as a second degree murder based upon the theory of 
depraved indifference. Expert testimony was produced by the 
defendant to show that she hallucinated, suffered from severe 
depression, and did not know what to do for her children. The 
appellant sought a finding that the case should be reduced to 
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Manslaughter or Negligent Homicide because the expert testimony 
was consistent with recklessness or criminal negligence. The 
trial court found the expert testimony * unbelievable and 
inconsistent with the other evidence and convicted of Second 
Degree Murder. The Supreme Court upheld the decision saying, 
"(m)alice may be express or implied." Nicholson, supra at 62. 
It is illogical to conclude that the lower mental state 
of Criminal Negligence must be proven by expert testimony. 
Appellant asserts that because he is a medical doctor 
the rule must be different and expert testimony must establish 
the mental state. He asserts that only medical experts can 
establish the standard of care by which he should be measured. 
To hold in Appellant's favor on this issue prejudices all other 
homicide defendants and denies them equal protection. No 
individual ought to be able to require a higher degree of proof 
for conviction of a criminal offense based upon his education or 
profession. 
C Even if the state had a burden to prove Defendant's 
conduct was grossly negligent by competent medical experts, the 
state met that burden. 
Although no expert witness gave a direct opinion in the 
exact words "gross deviation", Dr. Branch's statement succinctly 
shows he felt Defendant's conduct grossly negligent: 
"...what would I tell a resident in training? He better 
not ever, ever do that again or I'll see to it that he's on the 
street." (T. Vol.Ill, p.225) 
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Dr. Chan's emphatic statement when asked if the 
hypothetical was within the standard of care was "absolutely 
not." (T. Vol.Ill, pp.256). He then went on to say that while 
the chances of survival in a neonate facility would be 99%, this 
child's chances of dying when left with a lay person increases 
ten to twenty times (T. Vol.Ill, p.273). 
D. Proof given by competent medical experts was 
sufficient to give jurors an understanding of "...all the 
circumstances from the point of view of the defendant." U.C.A. 
76-2-103(4) (1953 as amended). 
Even in medical malpractice cases where the impropriety 
is of such a nature that lay persons could judge from common 
knowledge and experience that such injury would not happen if 
there had been proper skill and care, expert testimony is not 
necessary as to the standard of skill and care required of the 
physician. Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980). 
The exception is typical of cases where instruments are 
left in patients during surgery, but has also been applied to a 
case where a chiropractor violently jerked the neck of a patient. 
Malmstrom v. Olsen, 400 P.2d 209 (Utah 1965). 
Here there is competent evidence that the victim was 
suffering a progressive and potentially fatal disease which could 
be treated by another physician with a 99% certainty of survival 
if treated in a nearby and accessible hospital. It is within the 
common knowledge and experience of lay jurors that it would be 
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grossly negligent to leave that child in the hands of a lay 
person. 
Even if the court finds that the standard of medical 
malpractice suits should be used in a criminal case, the state 
met that burden because the impropriety of Defendants acts are 
within the common knowledge and experience of laymen. 
A case cited by Appellant holds that "...expert 
testimony is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed 
the plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is 
within the common knowledge and experience of laymen." 
Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980). 
The major aspect of defendant's conduct which the state 
asserts was negligent is the failure to hospitalize the victim, 
prior to, during and after the delivery. The defendant is not 
authorized to practice in a hospital, nor does he have the 
expertise or authorization to perform tocolysis or oxygenation in 
a neonate facility. The decision not to hospitalize is therefore 
less a medical decision than one based on common knowledge, 
experience, economics, and probability. The defendant testified 
that he made the decision based on his feeling that Ivy Young 
could make what he considered common sense observations. (T. 
Vol.IV, p.177). 
Defendant asserts that Ivy Young was an intervening 
cause because she should have perceived the baby's worsening 
condition. If one accepts that position, then the decisions of 
the defendant were clearly within the Nixdorf exception. 
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POINT III 
THE STATE'S EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED 
A. The expert medical testimony presented by the State 
was properly admitted under U.R.E, 702. 
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the acts of 
the defendant evidencing the nature and degree of the risk were 
established by expert medical testimony. The expert medical 
testimony presented by the state was properly admitted because it 
conformed to the only rule of evidence applicable to the 
situation: 
"If scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise. Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 702. 
The standard for the jury in this case is "the standard 
of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." U.C.A. 76-
2-103(4). Since the standard is an ^ordinary person standard', 
the expert medical testimony is not necessary, but merely helpful 
or likely to "assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence." 
B. Even under the medical malpractice model, the 
State's expert testimony was admissible because there is no 
recognized specialty in home delivery and the standard of care 
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for the delivery and immediate aftercare of infants is common to 
all specialties. 
The standard for medical experts testifying in cases in 
medical malpractice actions is well established: 
11
 ...[A]n expert witness belonging to one 
school may competently testify against a 
member of another school once sufficient 
foundation has been laid to show that the 
method of treatment - and hence the standard 
of care - is common to both schools. " 
Burton v. Younqblood, 711 P.2d 245 at 248 
(Utah 1935). 
One of the state's witnesses, Dr. Ware Branch, testified 
that he taught at the University of Utah Medical School. He 
testified that there was no recognized specialty in home 
deliveries in the State of Utah to his knowledge (T. Vol.Ill 
p.186). He testified that he taught both residents of obstetrics 
and gynecology as well as general principles of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology to medical students on rotations. He testified that 
he was familiar with the standard of care for physicians 
generally, general practitioners, and specialists and that the 
general principles constituting the standard of care would not 
vary from a doctor practicing in a hospital setting as opposed to 
a home setting. 
Dr. Chan likewise testified in cross examination, that 
the standard of care would not vary from a home delivery to a 
hospital delivery. (T. Vol.Ill, p.300). He testified that he 
taught at the University of Utah to residents and interns and was 
familiar with the standard of care for physicians in pediatrics, 
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family practice, anesthesiology and obstetrics (T. Vol.Ill, 
p.235) . 
In this case, there are not two schools of thought. 
There is no specialty of home birthing. The only legitimate 
school the appellant can claim is Family Practice, to which he is 
board certified, but to which Dr. Branch and Dr. Chan are well 
qualified to testify. 
This court should not disturb the ruling of the Circuit 
court in this regard: 
"This court has repeatedly stated that 
the trial judge has the primary responsibility 
for determining whether a particular witness 
qualifies as an expert and its ruling will not 
be disturbed unless it was clearly in error." 
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 
667 P.2d 49,52 (Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
When a person engages a physician, he literally places 
his life in the hands of the doctor. He entrusts his faith in 
the diagnostic ability of the doctor and in his judgment 
regarding treatment. This is so because the science of medicine 
is so complex and the nature of the risk so personal that we do 
not expect laymen to be able to objectively discern the manifold 
symptoms and treatments. 
The ordinary person expects his physician to make 
certain decisions for him. The ordinary person expects that when 
the patient must make a decision, the doctor will provide him 
with all of the available information that can be understood by a 
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layman. The purpose of that expectation is to allow the patient 
to make an informed decision. For a doctor to withhold such 
information is an ethical or moral decision, but not a medical 
one. 
This case is not of "how to treat" but "whether to 
treat" a diagnosed disease. Defendant decided not to treat the 
disease, which turned out to be a wrong decision. Defendant now 
seeks to avoid responsibility by blaming the grandmother for 
failing to make a decision to have the infant treated in spite of 
Defendant's decision not to treat. 
Ivy Young's actions were taken in a vacuum created by 
the defendant. Defendant left the premature infant, Jareth 
Young, in the care of Ivy Young without the basic information 
necessary to make an informed decision. 
Defendant diagnosed the disease but never shared his 
diagnosis with the family. He never told them the gravity of the 
disease or the degree of the risk. He never explained the 
progressive nature of the disease. What explanation he gave of 
the symptomatology was inaccurate and misleading. He never 
explained the possible treatment, the high-tech alternatives 
available, or the need to hospitalize in a tertiary treatment 
facility. He kept all of that information to himself and then 
charged the grandmother with the responsibility of watching the 
baby. All of this after he had repeatedly told Ivy that her 
worries were unfounded and after having rebuked her for 
"fussing." 
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Given those circumstances, the jury was justified in 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the 
death of Jareth Young by failing to properly treat the symptoms 
of Respiratory Distress and abandoning the child in the hands of 
a lay person. A substantial and unjustifiable risk of death was 
created for Jareth Young, and the failure to perceive the risk 
was a gross deviation from the standard of care of an ordinary 
person as viewed from the Defendant's standpoint. 
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ADDENDUM 
Page No. 
Utah Code Annotated 7 6-2-103 
Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent 
or willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal 
negligence or criminally negligent," . . . . . . 1 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 
Testimony by experts 2 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-103 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-102, enacted by Collateral References. 
U 1973, en. 196, § 76-2-102. Criminal Law<S=>20. 
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 29. 
21 Am. Jur. 2d 162, Criminal Law § 81. 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or willfully"; 
"fcaowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and "crim-
inal negligence or criminally negligent."—A person engages in conduct : 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature 
of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surround-
ing his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but con-
sciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circum-
stances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard 
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the cir-
cumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
History: 0, 1S63, 76-2-103, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-103; L. 1974, eh. 32.
 C r i m i n a l L a w ^ 2 2 . 
* 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31. 
Compiler's Notes.
 2 1 Am_ J u r_ 2 d 1 M > C r i m i E a l L a w § 8 2 -
The 1974 amendment inserted "or will-
fully" in subsec. (1); substituted "or Law Reviews. 
maIieiou3lv" for "or is reckless" in sub- „ . 
aec. (3); "and made a minor change in L f c a h Legislative Survey—1974, 19/4 
punctuation. Utah L. Rev. 643. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
"Knowingly." Malice was implied or presumed from 
In proceeding against public official for intentional poisoning and killing of dog 
receiving illegal fees, it was not error belonging to another person; tact that 
for court to define term "knowingly" in ° ™ » o f fog poisoned by detendant was 
language of former Penal Code definition. ^ n o w n to defendant did^ not preclude 
Skeen v. Chambers, 31 U. 36, 36 P. 492. finainS that poison was administered mah-
' ' ciously. State v. Coleman, 29 U. 41 v, 82 
"Malice" and "maliciously." F- 465. 
Former Penal Code definition of malice Ifc w a a sufficient if the court followed 
was properly given bv the court in its substantially the statutory definition. State 
instructions to the jury on the trial of v- Inlow, 44 U. 485, 501, 141 P. 530, Ann. 
an indictment for homicide. People v. Cas. 1917A, 741. 
Callaghan, 4 U. 49, 57, 6 P. 49. "Malice," as applied to murder, waa the 
31 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 702 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Pregnancy. 
Relation to expert testimony. 
Pregnancy. 
The admission of a mother's testimony on 
the subject of gestation period of her pregnancy 
was not error. Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982). 
Relation to expert testimony. 
Trial court properly admitted testimony of a 
security guard, who compared a photograph of 
a footprint to the footprints that he saw at bur-
glarized premises. The fact that a question 
might be capable of scientific determination 
does not make lay opinion inadmissible if the 
provisions of this rule are met. State v. Ellis, 
748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Ability to see, hear, smell, or oth-
erwise sense, as proper subject of opinion by 
lay witness, 10 A.L.R.3d 258. 
Competency of nonexpert's testimony based 
on sound alone as to speed of motor vehicle 
involved in accident, 33 A.L.R.3d 1405. 
Admissibility of nonexpert opinion testi-
mony as to weather conditions, 56 A.L.R.3d 
575. 
Competency of nonexpert witness to testify, 
in criminal case, based upon personal observa-
tion, as to whether person was under the influ-
ence of drugs, 21 A.L.R.4th 905. 
Rule 702, Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim. Ruie 56(2), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971), was substantially the 
same. 
Cross-References. — Blood tests to deter-
mine parentage, expert testimony, §§ 78-25-18 
to 78-25-23, 78-45a-7 to 78-45a-10. 
Discovery of expert's opinion. Rule 26(b)(4), 
U.R.C.P. 
Drug paraphernalia, expert opinion in deter-
mining nature of object as, § 58-37a-4. 
Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting 
number of expert witnesses, Rule 16, U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Basis for opinion. 
Discretion of court. 
Qualification as expert. 
Reliability. 
Scientific evidence. 
Subjects of opinion. 
—Drug use. 
—Identification. 
Cited. 
Basis for opinion. 
Testimony of expert witness who relied on 
conversations with witnesses out of court was 
admissible, since he may have meant he found 
statements of witnesses reliable for purposes of 
his making judgment. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 
P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). 
Facts or data used by a properly qualified 
expert in forming an opinion need not be in 
evidence if they are of a type reasonably relied 
on by experts in the witness's field of expertise. 
Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 
682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). 
Trial court did not err in allowing an ex-
pert's testimony relating to drug experience re-
ports not in evidence. Barson ex rel. Barson v. 
E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). 
Expert's testimony was properly excluded 
where witness was unable to give his opinion 
based upon data made known to him at trial, 
as, absent personal knowledge of the facts, this 
was the only ground on which the evidence 
could have come in. Highland Constr. Co. v. 
Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
Discretion of court. 
It is within the discretion of the trial court to 
determine the suitability of expert testimony 
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